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ABSTRACT 1 
Major depressive disorder is a debilitating condition characterised by diverse 2 
neurocognitive and behavioural deficits. Nevertheless, our species-typical capacity for 3 
depressed mood implies that it serves an adaptive function. Here, we apply an 4 
interdisciplinary theory of brain function to explain depressed mood and its clinical 5 
manifestations. Combining insights from the free-energy principle with evolutionary 6 
theorising in psychology, we argue that depression reflects an adaptive response to 7 
perceived threats of aversive social outcomes (e.g., exclusion) that minimises the 8 
likelihood of surprising interpersonal exchanges (i.e., those with unpredictable 9 
outcomes). We suggest that psychopathology typically arises from ineffectual 10 
attempts to alleviate interpersonal difficulties and/or hyper-reactive neurobiological 11 
responses to social stress (i.e., uncertainty), which often stems from early experience 12 
that social uncertainty is difficult to resolve. 13 
 14 
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An Evolutionary Systems Approach to Depression 17 
Why do we become depressed? Why are some of us particularly prone to depression? 18 
And how is this best managed? To answer these questions, we require an 19 
interdisciplinary approach that synthesises studies of the depressed brain with 20 
psychological research on its ecological, ontogenetic and biobehavioural correlates [1, 21 
2]. To this end, we apply an integrative evolutionary systems theory (EST) of human 22 
brain function to explain depressed mood and its clinical manifestations. The EST in 23 
question rests on two uncontroversial assumptions. The first appeals to a consensus 24 
among cognitive scientists that the brain is a hierarchical, self-organising system 25 
sculpted by evolution [3-5]. This hierarchy ranges from lower-order, highly 26 
specialised neural subsystems responsible for sensory-motor processing; through to  27 
highly integrated cortical regions that develop more gradually and underlie the 28 
sophisticated, executive cognitive faculties unique to humans [see Box 1]. This calls 29 
for a theory of global brain function that explains how depression emerges from 30 
coordinated interactions within hierarchically integrated neuronal systems. The 31 
second assumption echoes dynamic systems approaches that situate the brain within 32 
the evolutionary dynamics of the brain-body-environment system [6-8]. According to 33 
this view, the neural mechanisms responsible for depression can only be understood 34 
by considering the broader context of human evolution, enculturation, development, 35 
embodiment and behaviour.  36 
 37 
We aim to exemplify this approach by offering an interdisciplinary hypothesis of the 38 
depressed brain. Following the free-energy principle (FEP; see [5]), we first discuss 39 
how depressive disorders emerge from the functioning of, and disruptions to, 40 
hierarchical neural dynamics that seek to minimise uncertainty. We then integrate this 41 
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work with psychological research on the adaptive function of depression, along with 42 
the familial, developmental and psychobiological mechanisms that often underlie it. 43 
We propose that our species-typical capacity for depressed mood can be explained as 44 
an evolved biobehavioural strategy that responds adaptively to adverse interpersonal 45 
conditions by minimising the likelihood of unpredictable social interactions. We 46 
discuss how our model builds on theories of clinical depression in the active inference 47 
literature, before turning to the hierarchical neural mechanics that underlie depressed 48 
mood and depressive disorder.  49 
 50 
Applying the Free-Energy Principle to Depression 51 
The FEP is a global theory of neural structure and function suggesting the brain can 52 
be seen as a “prediction machine” that attempts to maximise the evidence for a 53 
creature’s model of the world by minimising an upper limit on surprise [i.e., free-54 
energy; see Box 2]. In line with predictive coding, the FEP describes the brain as a 55 
hierarchical generative model – a hierarchy of hypotheses about the world that 56 
enables a reduction of surprise by minimising discrepancies between incoming 57 
sensory inputs and top-down predictions [9]. Conditional expectations are thought to 58 
be encoded by deep pyramidal cells (i.e., representation units) at each level of the 59 
cortical hierarchy that convey predictions downward to suppress errors at the level 60 
below, while prediction errors are encoded by superficial pyramidal cells (i.e., error 61 
units) that convey errors forward to revise expectations at the level above [10]. This 62 
allows us to minimise surprise by updating our internal models (i.e., perception). 63 
Alternatively, we can selectively sample sensory data to ensure that our predictions 64 
are self-fulfilling – by changing how we act upon the world to confirm our 65 
expectations (i.e., active inference [11]). Thus, perception and action operate 66 
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synergistically to minimise prediction errors and optimise our internal representations 67 
of the environment. A key corollary of this model is that our predictions are optimised 68 
by evolution, development and learning. Emphasis is placed on adaptive priors – 69 
inherited expectations about the way our world unfolds that have been shaped by 70 
natural selection to guide action-perception cycles toward adaptive (i.e., unsurprising) 71 
states [5, 12].  72 
 73 
To date, applications of the FEP to depressive disorders have chiefly concentrated on 74 
two processes, stemming from different levels of the cortical hierarchy. The first 75 
relates to limbic deficits in minimising prediction error. Barrett and colleagues 76 
suggest that depressive disorders arise from aberrant interoceptive predictions 77 
originating from abnormalities within the (limbic) agranular visceromotor cortex, 78 
which is central to emotional processing, energy regulation and allostatic responses to 79 
stress [13, 14]. These abnormalities can arise from past exposure to sustained distress, 80 
and generate false (interoceptive) predictions about the body’s upcoming autonomic, 81 
metabolic and immunological needs that chronically activate physiological stress 82 
responses (e.g., dysregulation of the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis and 83 
pro-inflammatory states). Over time, the visceromotor systems try to minimise 84 
prediction error by producing sickness behaviours (e.g., negative affect and fatigue; 85 
also see [15]) that reduce energy expenditure and ultimately manifest in depression 86 
[13]. Here, depression is seen as a disorder of allostasis, characterised by energy 87 
dysregulation and deficits in interoceptive inference; i.e., an insensitivity to prediction 88 
errors and/or a miscalibration of their precision – see glossary [14]. These deficits 89 
lead to a failure to update dysfunctional internal models (e.g., cognitive rigidity), 90 
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perpetuating further metabolic inefficiencies and engendering the downward spiral 91 
that typifies depressive illness.  92 
 93 
The second class of models concentrates on impairments in top-down expectations of 94 
reward. Checkroud [16] has described the depressed brain as a hierarchical 95 
constellation of depressive beliefs, which impose a consistent negative bias in 96 
predictions that manifests in anhedonic features and the down-regulation of neural 97 
reward systems (e.g., dopaminergic and serotonergic dysfunction). In line with active 98 
inference, these beliefs exacerbate depression by prompting the individual to actively 99 
sample the environment to confirm negative predictions (e.g., learned helplessness). 100 
Others have suggested that depressive disorders impair reward-approach behaviours 101 
by causing a pathological underconfidence in one’s predictions [17], or by distorting 102 
higher-order evaluations of the self (e.g., low self-worth), disrupting social behaviour 103 
by overweighting the likelihood of aversive interactions [18]. Each of these proposals 104 
echo models of reinforcement learning in computational psychiatry and evolutionary 105 
biology suggesting that depression emerges from successive discrepancies between 106 
actual and expected reward outcomes (i.e., prediction errors), entrenching (empirical) 107 
prior beliefs that rewards are unlikely which inhibit reward-approach behaviours [19, 108 
20]. 109 
 110 
Taken together, the frameworks considered here suggest that depression entails 111 
impairments in reward-approach systems emerging from two neurocognitive 112 
processes – deficits in the predictive processing of sensory evidence; and prior beliefs 113 
that negatively bias predictions. Although this perspective of depression as false 114 
inference offers a cohesive, neurobiologically plausible account of the biobehavioural 115 
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deficits observed in depressive illness, two important questions remain. First, by 116 
concentrating on depressive disorders, the models above say little about our species-117 
typical capacity for depressed or low mood. The notable exception is a formal 118 
(computational) scheme that defines emotional valence in terms of the rate of change 119 
in free-energy over time, with positive and negative affect tracking a decrease and 120 
increase in free-energy, respectively (see [17]). In this model, negative moods enable 121 
an organism to respond adaptively to unexpected changes in the world by increasing 122 
the (learning) rate of evidence accumulation – overweighing recent sensory inputs 123 
over prior experiences to heighten sensitivity to environmental change, thereby 124 
minimising prediction error [17]. However, this does not specifically address the 125 
adaptive significance of depression per se. Second, the literature to date sheds little 126 
light on the ecological conditions responsible for the positive selective pressure that 127 
depression appears to have [see Box 3]. If depression instantiates an adaptive prior, it 128 
should minimise surprise in response to specific environmental challenges that have 129 
threatened our inclusive fitness (i.e., free-energy) over evolutionary time. Identifying 130 
this adaptive function is arguably central to understanding why depression occurs. To 131 
address these issues, we hope to build upon the active inference literature by 132 
incorporating complementary insights drawn from an evolutionary systems approach 133 
to psychology. 134 
  135 
Insights from an Evolutionary Systems Approach to Psychology  136 
In psychology, evolutionary systems models have typically focused on the dynamic 137 
interplay between evolutionary and developmental processes (e.g., [8, 21-25]), an 138 
approach that has been further extended to reconcile theoretical divisions between 139 
major paradigms in the field (see [4]). According to this perspective, the embodied 140 
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brain and behaviour emerge from selection acting on dynamic interactions between 141 
the levels of causation identified by Tinbergen – adaptation, phylogeny, ontogeny, 142 
and mechanism [26]. This causal hierarchy is arguably recapitulated by paradigms in 143 
psychology, which concentrate differentially on four overlapping levels of 144 
explanation – ultimate hypotheses for adaptive, species-typical characteristics (i.e., 145 
evolutionary psychology); epigenetic explanations for intergenerational, between-146 
group differences (i.e., evolutionary developmental biology and psychology); 147 
dynamical explanations for individual similarities and differences (i.e., developmental 148 
psychology); and mechanistic explanations for real-time phenomena (i.e., 149 
psychological subdisciplines such as cognitive, biological, personality, social and 150 
clinical psychology) [4]. Central to EST is the need to explore how these causal levels 151 
interact – evolutionary influences on neural structure and function constrain 152 
individual development and learning, while effects at these more proximate levels can 153 
shape the evolution of the brain [3, 27]. To explain depression then, we require a 154 
multi-level hypothesis that synthesises diverse fields of psychological inquiry to 155 
explain both why it is adaptive, along with how it emerges from intergenerational, 156 
developmental and real-time mechanisms.  157 
 158 
Although there are various Darwinian models of depression [28], a theme common to 159 
many of these is that low mood reflects an adaptive biobehavioural strategy that 160 
conserves or reallocates energy and resources in unpropitious social environments [29, 161 
30]. According to this view, depressed mood states are elicited by aversive 162 
interpersonal outcomes (e.g., exclusion, defeat, or loss) that indicate a critical loss of 163 
control over social relationships that were critical to ancestral fitness [31]. A model 164 
that incorporates influential theories in this area and shows promising conceptual 165 
 9 
parallels with the FEP is the social risk hypothesis (technically, risk corresponds to 166 
uncertainty and uncertainty is expected surprise or free energy). This maintains that 167 
depressed mood reflects an adaptive, risk-averse approach to social interaction that 168 
reduces the likelihood of further aversive outcomes by: (1) increasing our cognitive 169 
sensitivity to (sensory) cues of social risk; (2) reducing our (behavioural) propensity 170 
for taking social risks; and (3) initiating signalling behaviours that elicit support and 171 
defuse conflict [32]. 172 
 173 
The idea that depression reflects an evolved response to adverse social conditions 174 
concords with evidence that extends across Tinbergen’s remaining levels of inquiry. 175 
The intergenerational transmission of susceptibility to depressive disorders due to 176 
deleterious social environments is widely documented [33, 34], with studies involving 177 
rodents, primates, and humans showing that exposure to social stressors (e.g., low 178 
maternal care and social defeat) produces potentially heritable epigenetic changes that 179 
confer risk for disorder by heightening stress reactivity [35, 36]. Ontogenetically, 180 
exposure to early social stress (e.g., parental loss, abuse, or neglect) is a strong 181 
predictor of depressive vulnerability [37], and is thought to heighten susceptibility to 182 
disorder by leading to hyperactivity of the HPA axis [38, 39] and up-regulating pro-183 
inflammatory immune responses [40]. Behavioural and neuroimaging studies further 184 
suggest that the risk of depressive onset rises markedly in adolescence because of an 185 
increased sensitivity to social threats in this period [41, 42]. Finally, research across 186 
the sub-disciplines highlights an intimate connection between depression and the 187 
social world (see [43]). For example, the precipitants of depression are typically 188 
interpersonal in nature [44]; social support and belonging are key protective factors 189 
[45]; and typical correlates of depression clearly exemplify negative self-other 190 
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relations (e.g., low self-esteem [46]). Consistent with the social risk hypothesis, there 191 
are also multiple lines of evidence to suggest that low mood is associated with 192 
biobehavioural changes that facilitate adaptive responses to social stress. Depressive 193 
cognition is characterised by a specific, attentional bias towards socially-threatening 194 
stimuli [47] and increased rumination about interpersonal problems [48], while 195 
normative depressed states have been shown to increase the accuracy of social 196 
inferences (e.g., depressive realism [49]) and improve social problem-solving [50]. 197 
Furthermore, many features of depression – such as anhedonia, a negative thinking 198 
bias and social withdrawal – reduce exposure to social risks by inhibiting reward-199 
approach behaviours [51], while the signalling behaviours associated with depression 200 
(e.g., reassurance-seeking and submissive behaviours) explicitly attempt to elicit 201 
support and defuse potential conflict [52-54]. Notably, other studies have provided 202 
direct empirical support for the social risk hypothesis itself (Badcock & Allen, 2003; 203 
Badcock & Allen, 2007; Dunn, Whelton & Sharpe, 2012; Girard, Cohn, Mahoor, 204 
Mavadati, & Rosenwald, 2013). 205 
 206 
In light of such work, we suggest that the human capacity for depressed mood can be 207 
explained in terms of a risk-averse adaptive prior that minimises uncertainty in the 208 
social world when sensory cues indicate both a high degree of socio-environmental 209 
volatility (i.e., unpredictability) and an increased probability of aversive interpersonal 210 
outcomes (e.g., rejection, defeat or loss) (see Figure 1). This depressive response 211 
instantiates a “better safe than sorry” strategy that minimises the likelihood of 212 
unpredictable social interactions by causing adaptive changes in cognition (e.g., 213 
hypersensitivity to aversive social stimuli, a negative thinking bias and deficits in 214 
responses to reward) and action (e.g., risk-averse behaviours such as social 215 
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withdrawal). Epigenetic and ontogenetic mechanisms arguably support this function 216 
by sensitising the individual to socio-environmental volatility when developmental 217 
insults indicate that the probability of aversive social interactions is high, producing 218 
hyper-reactive stress response systems that heighten risk for disorder by increasing 219 
the precision of social prediction errors and prompting exaggerated, pathological 220 
responses to interpersonal stressors.  221 
 222 
Notably, the exacerbation of normative depressed states into severe, dysfunctional 223 
forms is also likely when depressive changes fail to alleviate social stress, creating a 224 
self-perpetuating cycle arising from heightened and prolonged arousal of ineffectual 225 
attempts to reduce socio-environmental volatility [32]. This, in turn, is likely to 226 
chronically activate neurophysiological stress responses and leads to debilitating 227 
sickness behaviours [13, 14]. As discussed above, previous applications of the FEP 228 
suggest that this depressive spiral is engendered by a positive feedback loop between 229 
two neurocognitive mechanisms – the increased precision of social prediction errors, 230 
coupled with a negative bias affecting social predictions. Following active inference, 231 
this is likely to engender ongoing depressive behaviours that seek to confirm negative 232 
biases, creating a self-fulfilling prophecy (i.e., high predictability) born from mutually 233 
reinforcing patterns of cognition and behaviour [16]. Here, depressed can be 234 
interpreted as a maladaptive pattern of dysregulated defences – if this depressive 235 
response is effective, an individual either escapes or avoids the social stressor or 236 
adapts to it; if the defence fails, the individual is at risk of entering a self-perpetuating 237 
dysregulated state, which falls beyond the normal range of adaptive functioning 238 
(Allen & Badcock, 2003; Gilbert, 2001). Nevertheless, it should also be recognised 239 
that clinical manifestations of depression can result from asocial causes that produce 240 
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neurobiological abnormalities typically associated with dysregulated mood (e.g., pro-241 
inflammatory immune responses induced by illness and medications; 40). 242 
 243 
The Depressed Brain 244 
It is widely accepted that depression emerges from bidirectional interactions between 245 
hierarchically organised neural regions. Most of the theoretical work in this area 246 
concentrates on two general brain systems that work in concert – a ventral affective 247 
system, including subcortical regions such as the amygdala and ventral striatum; and 248 
the prefrontal cortex (PFC), which modulates the reactions of the ventral affective 249 
system [1]. These systems are composed of subcortical neural circuits responsible for 250 
the unconscious processing of affective and social stimuli on the one hand; and on the 251 
other, executive networks that regulate affective states, with medial prefrontal regions 252 
playing a particularly important role in modulating visceral and behavioural responses 253 
in order to adapt them to the external milieu [1].  254 
 255 
More particularly, evidence gleaned from neuroimaging and animal studies suggests 256 
that depression involves dysfunction of the “extended visceromotor network”, in 257 
which the medial PFC regulates affective states by modulating visceromotor output 258 
via connections with the amygdala, ventral striatum, hypothalamus, and other 259 
subcortical regions [55]. Brain regions across this network regulate motivation (e.g., 260 
anhedonia and dopaminergic function) and neurobiological responses to stress, and 261 
play a central role in social threat and reward processing [39, 41, 56, 57]. 262 
Neurodevelopmental changes in these regions throughout adolescence are also 263 
thought to heighten vulnerability to disorder by increasing sensitivity to rapidly 264 
changing social contexts in this period (see Box 4). Collectively, such findings fit well 265 
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with our proposal that depression often stems from the need to adapt to complex 266 
social contexts, and manifests through the bidirectional interplay of hierarchical 267 
neuronal processes.  268 
 269 
Specifically, we speculate that the extended visceromotor system responds to 270 
volatility in the social environment by increasing the precision of social prediction 271 
errors, initiating changes in neuronally encoded expectations that increase attention to 272 
social cues and motivate risk-averse behaviours (e.g., social withdrawal). This 273 
heightened sensitivity to somatic and affective cues leads, in turn, to further avoidance 274 
of interpersonal stressors. The depressive response is adaptive when changes in mood 275 
state and behaviour reduce uncertainty in the face of socio-environmental change, and 276 
lead to re-engagement with that environment when volatility abates (which should, at 277 
least in part, be brought about by depressive behaviours; see [32]). However, 278 
following the active inference literature, we suggest that the depressive response 279 
becomes maladaptive when there are (neuromodulatory) failures of “precision 280 
engineered” visceromotor inference – produced, for instance, by sustained social 281 
distress – leading to illness behaviours which fail to respond to improvements in 282 
interpersonal contexts and can often exacerbate socio-environmental stress [13, 14]. 283 
Neurodevelopmentally, the PFC can also potentiate vulnerability to depression by 284 
underwriting the formation of distal goals that, when frustrated by rejection or failure, 285 
can lead to depression by suppressing the brain’s reward system [58] and the 286 
confidence in (or precision of) our beliefs about behaviour [59], thereby inhibiting 287 
goal-directed behaviours. 288 
  289 
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Ultimately, our basic claim is that depression can be viewed as an adaptive faculty 290 
that underwrites emotional allostasis in an increasingly prosocial and volatile world. 291 
Physiologically, this faculty increases sensitivity to interpersonal, affiliative and 292 
interoceptive cues. Clearly, sensitisation to stressful exteroceptive and interoceptive 293 
cues also has to be predicted by the hierarchical brain, which implicates the functional 294 
neuroanatomy described above. Under active inference, sensitivity to stress-related 295 
cues corresponds to their precision [13, 60], implicating neuromodulatory systems 296 
associated with reward, action selection and interoceptive inference [61-63]. 297 
Crucially, in order to act it is also necessary to attenuate the precision afforded to the 298 
sensory consequences of action (i.e., we have to ignore the fact that we are not 299 
currently acting). This means that an adaptive depressive response suspends sensory 300 
attenuation – and action – so that we can attend to interpersonal prediction errors and 301 
revise our (posterior) beliefs about our relationships with others, via perceptual 302 
inference and learning. Sensory attenuation can be regarded as the complement of 303 
sensory attention; i.e., attenuating or augmenting the gain (precision) afforded sensory 304 
prediction errors to ignore or select sensory information, respectively. According to 305 
this scheme, maladaptive forms of depression reflect a pervasive, self-maintaining 306 
failure of sensory attenuation, leading to ruminations, false inference and a 307 
concomitant inability to act and test these false beliefs.  308 
 309 
Interestingly, exactly the same conclusions (namely, a failure of sensory attenuation) 310 
have been drawn for a range of neuropsychiatric disorders, ranging from autism [64] 311 
to schizophrenia [65]. One could ask what is specific about this mechanism in 312 
depression, and respond by referring to the particular (interoceptive and affiliative) 313 
modalities affected. However, perhaps the more intriguing implication is that the 314 
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comorbidity of depression and other disorders might arise from a common 315 
pathophysiological mechanism, which can be explained in terms of false inference. 316 
 317 
Concluding Remarks 318 
In this opinion piece, we have endeavoured to contribute to the active inference 319 
literature on mood disorder by suggesting that normative levels of depressed mood 320 
instantiate an adaptive prior that minimises the likelihood of surprising interpersonal 321 
interactions when faced with threats of aversive social outcomes that typically 322 
compromised ancestral fitness. By extending beyond previous applications of the FEP 323 
to emphasise both the adaptive function of low mood and the causal role of the social 324 
ecology, we believe our model demonstrates the heuristic benefits of combining 325 
active inference with insights in psychology to improve our understanding of 326 
depressed mood and mood disorder. It also motivates new questions for research, 327 
calling for greater integration between neuroscientific and psychological approaches 328 
to explore the ways in which the neural mechanisms that underpin depression relate to 329 
behaviour, development and the social world [see Outstanding Questions]. In 330 
particular, the idea that depression can emerge from the need to navigate social risks 331 
stands to inform theory-driven approaches in computational psychiatry, which 332 
improve our understanding, prediction and treatment of mental illness by using 333 
simulations and mathematical models to capture complex interactions across multiple 334 
causal levels [19, 66].  335 
 336 
That said, we do not wish to imply that depression is solely attributable to social 337 
causes. In evolutionary psychology, for instance, the distinction between social and 338 
non-social depressive responses is widely recognised [Durisko 2015; Gilbert 2006], 339 
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and as we have noted, depression can also arise from depressogenic neuroanatomical 340 
abnormalities produced by influences other than unfavourable social conditions. 341 
Nevertheless, our model adds to the active inference literature by emphasising the 342 
importance of the social environment in explaining the aetiology and phenomenology 343 
of depression. This underscores the need to develop (computational) diagnostic tools 344 
that are capable of distinguishing between social and non-social forms in order to 345 
inform treatment decisions. 346 
 347 
In closing, our model also promotes clear avenues for intervention. To date, 348 
proponents of the FEP have advocated treatments that directly target dysregulated 349 
neural systems, such as psychopharmacological agents that act upon the 350 
neurotransmitter systems that encode precision or uncertainty (e.g., serotonin and 351 
dopamine [16]). They have also recommended the use of cognitive behavioural 352 
therapies to disrupt the spiral of self-defeating actions typical of depression [16], or to 353 
construct new prediction signals that modify the gain on prediction errors via the 354 
salience network [14]. Our own model adds to this work by emphasising the need to 355 
facilitate adaptive responses to social stress. This could well explain the efficacy of 356 
interpersonal psychotherapy as a treatment for major depressive disorder [67], and 357 
highlights the value of prevention and early intervention efforts that reduce 358 
vulnerability by targeting modifiable risk factors in the social environment. Given the 359 
heterogeneous nature of depression, we also recommend the development of 360 
(computational) diagnostic tools capable of distinguishing between social and non-361 
social forms in order to inform treatment decisions. Finally, simply having a positive 362 
and principled framework within which to understand depression – and the rationale 363 
for therapeutic interventions – is likely to be helpful for those seeking treatment. Our 364 
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synthesis can be used to help clients understand why they have depression, and to 365 
explain why, for example, it might be useful to combine interpersonal psychotherapy 366 
with antidepressants.  367 
 368 
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Glossary 374 
Active inference: A corollary of the free-energy principle, which states that we 375 
minimise surprise (i.e., prediction errors) by changing our predictions (i.e., 376 
perception) or by acting upon the world to elicit sensations that conform to 377 
predictions (i.e., action). 378 
Adaptive prior: A prior endowed by evolution to underwrite adaptive fitness. 379 
Association cortex: Regions of the cerebral cortex that are not primary sensory or 380 
motor projection areas, including the prefrontal cortex, and extensive parts of the 381 
temporal, parietal and occipital cortices.. 382 
Empirical priors: Priors found in hierarchical models that can be learned or inferred 383 
under priors from the level above.  384 
Entropy: The uncertainty or average surprise associated with outcomes sampled from 385 
a probability distribution. A distribution with low entropy means, on average, that the 386 
outcome is relatively predictable.  387 
Evolutionary systems theory: A multidisciplinary paradigm that explains dynamic, 388 
evolving systems in terms of co-action between self-organisation and general 389 
selection (e.g., natural selection) over time. This produces complex adaptive systems, 390 
like the brain, that adapt to the environment through an autonomous process of 391 
selection that recruits the outcomes of locally interacting components within that 392 
system to select a subset of those components for replication or enhancement.  393 
Free-energy principle: A generalisation of predictive coding that asserts that 394 
organisms actively minimise an upper bound on surprise (i.e., free energy), which, 395 
under simplifying assumptions, translates to (precision weighted) prediction error.  396 
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Generative Model: A probabilistic mapping from hidden causes in the environment 397 
to observed consequences (sensory data), typically specified in terms of the likelihood 398 
of observing some data (given their causes) and priors (on these causes).    399 
Interoception: The perception and integration of autonomic, hormonal, visceral and 400 
immunological (bodily) signals. 401 
Precision: The inverse variance, volatility, or reliability of a signal. In predictive 402 
coding, prediction errors are weighted by precisions that determine the relative 403 
influence of bottom-up (error) and top-down (representation) signals (e.g., a high 404 
precision on error signals corresponds to low confidence in top-down beliefs). 405 
Dynamic precision weighting is mediated by neuromodulation and underwrites 406 
psychological processes such as attentional selection and sensory attenuation. 407 
Predictive coding: A processing scheme for inferring the likely causes of sensory 408 
data by minimising prediction error. Typically, this entails a hierarchical generative 409 
model (e.g., the brain) in which top-down signals convey predictions and bottom-up 410 
signals convey (precision weighted) prediction errors. 411 
Prior: The probability distribution or density on the causes of data that encode beliefs 412 
about those causes prior to observing the data. 413 
Surprise: The negative log probability of sensory experiences encountered by an 414 
agent. Also known as surprisal or self-information.  415 
Visceromotor cortex: Agranular (limbic) regions of isocortex and allocortex that 416 
regulate the hormonal, immune and autonomic nervous systems, including the 417 
cingulate cortex, the posterior ventral medial prefrontal cortex, the posterior 418 
orbitofrontal cortex and ventral portions of the anterior insula.  419 
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BOX 1: The Hierarchical Structure of the Brain 420 
In psychology, it has long been recognised that the brain entails a hierarchical 421 
structure ranging from highly specialised sensorimotor systems at its lowest levels 422 
through to developmentally flexible, highly integrated systems responsible for higher-423 
order executive functions [3, 4]. A hierarchical neural architecture is also emphasised 424 
by predictive coding approaches in neuroscience, which explore how the brain 425 
minimises prediction error via recurrent message-passing between cortical levels [9, 426 
68, 69]. More recently, imaging studies in network neuroscience have provided direct 427 
evidence that the brain exhibits a multiscale hierarchical organisation, with a given 428 
node (e.g., network, module or sub-module) itself comprising a network of smaller 429 
interacting nodes at a lower level [68, 70] (see Figure I).  430 
 431 
Comparative work suggests that a hierarchical architecture is a hallmark of the 432 
mammalian brain, progressing from highly segregated sensorimotor hierarchies 433 
common to all mammals through to the cortical association areas that confer the 434 
adaptive advantage of heightened cognitive control among primates [71, 72]. Again, 435 
this structure is thought to exemplify the complementary relationship between 436 
evolution and development – selection has canalised early sensorimotor regions that 437 
serve as neurodevelopmental anchors, allowing for the progressive, activity-438 
dependent self-organisation of widely distributed association networks that lie furthest 439 
from sensory patterning centres [71, 73]. This neuroplasticity enhances adaptability 440 
by producing higher-order, “domain-general” faculties that are able to respond 441 
flexibly to rapidly changing environments [6, 73]. 442 
 443 
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It is now broadly accepted that a hierarchical neural structure is favoured by selection. 444 
It enhances evolvability because deleterious changes to a single component of the 445 
system are unlikely to affect the system itself, and it allows adaptive novelties to 446 
emerge without disrupting global functioning [70]. Computer simulations of evolving 447 
networks have also shown that selection favours a hierarchical organisation because it 448 
conserves the (spatial, processing and metabolic) cost of neural connections; improves 449 
problem-solving by recursively combining solutions to sub-problems; and adapts 450 
more rapidly to new environments than non-hierarchical structures [74]. Finally, the 451 
hierarchical brain is thought to promote “self-organised criticality”. This is a 452 
dynamical state poised between completely ordered, stable cycles of activity and 453 
highly complex, chaotic ones that optimises evolvability because it allows small 454 
extrinsic changes to elicit large intrinsic reorganisations. The hierarchical segregation 455 
of neural networks into distributed neighbourhoods has been found to stretch the 456 
parameter range for self-organised criticality by allowing subcritical and supercritical 457 
dynamics to co-exist simultaneously [75]. Since systems at criticality have optimal 458 
information-processing capacities, a structure that extends this critical region is likely 459 
to be naturally selected [76].  460 
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BOX 2: The Free-Energy Principle 461 
The FEP seeks to explain how biological systems maintain their integrity by 462 
occupying a constricted number of states [5]. It suggests that all organisms actively 463 
reduce the entropy (i.e. disorder or dispersion) of their sensory and physical states by 464 
minimising free-energy. Borrowed from statistical thermodynamics and machine 465 
learning, free-energy is an information theory quantity which limits (by being greater 466 
than) the entropy of a brain’s sensations or sensory samples from the environment. In 467 
this context, entropy (the mathematical description of uncertainty) refers to the (long-468 
term) average of surprise: a statistical concept referring to the negative log probability 469 
of sensory samples encountered by an agent. This probability is also known as 470 
(Bayesian) model evidence. 471 
 472 
These principles have important implications for understanding how biotic agents 473 
work. Because the repertoire of states an organism occupies is limited, the probability 474 
of these states has low entropy (i.e., surprise). Thus, an organism’s distal imperative 475 
of maintaining functional states within physiological bounds (i.e., homeostasis) 476 
translates into a proximal avoidance of surprise [5]. Surprise itself cannot be 477 
evaluated; however, biological systems can minimise surprise vicariously by 478 
minimising their free-energy – which roughly translates to prediction error, weighted 479 
by its precision. 480 
 481 
The FEP appeals to predictive coding by characterising the brain as a hierarchical 482 
inference machine that minimises prediction error by seeking to match incoming 483 
sensory inputs with top-down predictions [see Figure II]. This occurs in two ways. 484 
First, we can improve our predictions by altering internal states (i.e., perception). 485 
Second, we can act upon the world to confirm our predictions (i.e., action). Thus, 486 
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action and perception operate synergistically to optimise an organism’s model of the 487 
environment. Crucially, to minimise free-energy, the precision of prediction errors 488 
also has to be predicted, invoking notions of attentional gain (psychologically) and 489 
neuromodulation (physiologically). 490 
 491 
The FEP also applies to the morphology, development and evolution of the brain. It 492 
suggests that instead of just containing a model of the world, the brain is a model of 493 
the world – a physical transcription of causal regularities in the environment that is 494 
optimised by evolution. This model instantiates genetically specified (empirical) prior 495 
beliefs that have minimised free-energy (i.e., maximised model evidence) over 496 
evolutionary time by ensuring an organism seeks out a small number of unsurprising 497 
states that are consistent with its phenotype and environment. In other words, natural 498 
selection is nature’s way of performing Bayesian model selection to minimise the 499 
(variational) free energy of phenotypes (i.e., generative models). 500 
  501 
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Box 3: The Adaptive Significance of Depression  502 
 25 
Box 4: The Adolescent Brain and Risk for Depression 503 
The brain undergoes significant maturation in adolescence, involving processes that 504 
begin with puberty and continue until a young person is in their mid-to-late twenties 505 
[77]. Over this period, there is a progressive increase in white matter, alongside 506 
synaptic pruning and grey matter loss, which have the effect of delineating more 507 
clearly defined large-scale brain networks [78]. Subcortical regions, including the 508 
primary components of the reward system, undergo more rapid maturation [79], while 509 
the most prolonged development is in association cortex, including prefrontal regions 510 
that are implicated in social processing [78, 80]. 511 
 512 
It is now widely accepted that the functional and structural changes that accompany 513 
adolescence reflect a particularly sensitive period for adapting to the social world. 514 
Brain imaging studies show that adolescence is typified by significant alterations in 515 
social and affective processing systems, which are thought to increase risk for mood 516 
disorder by heightening sensitivity to social threats in this period [41, 80-82]. 517 
Coincident with these neurodevelopmental processes, there are also substantial 518 
changes in the adolescent social environment. Peer relationships become increasingly 519 
important, hierarchical and complex, and there is significant socio-environmental 520 
volatility – friendships change frequently, and romantic relationships are typically 521 
short-lived [83]. 522 
 523 
It is unsurprising, then, that the period from adolescence to early adulthood is a peak 524 
time for the onset of depression [42]. During adolescence, sources of social 525 
uncertainty are frequently encountered. Maturation of subcortical regions, along with 526 
marked hormonal changes [82, 84], increase sensitivity to affective and self-relevant 527 
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social cues. Moreover, prefrontal cortical development leads, on the one hand, to 528 
improved regulation of affective processes, but on the other, heightens sensitivity to 529 
the nuance and complexity of interpersonal relationships [58]. For this reason, 530 
increased vulnerability to depression starts in puberty but is maintained well beyond 531 
adolescence. 532 
533 
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